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In Self-Constitution Christine Korsgaard argues that our reasons are public. What she
means by this is that if a rational agent has a reason to perform some action, it is a reason
that has normative force for everyone who is a rational agent. Korsgaard also argues in
Self-Constitution that when we will a course of action, we must do so in the form of a
determinate commitment. Doing so requires determining some reasons to be bad reasons
to opt out of the course of action that we will. Finally, Korsgaard claims that the selves
occupying our own body at different times are distinct agents unless their wills are
unified. In this paper, I will argue that Korsgaard’s views about diachronic identity
produce tensions between her claims that reasons are public and that volition involves
determinate commitment. If reasons are public, then my future self’s reasons whatever
they may be cannot be preemptively dismissed as bad reasons. Yet, in order to commit
ourselves to a determinate course of action through our wills, Korsgaard claims that this
is precisely what we must do. The only way for Korsgaard to resolve this conflict
between her claims is to argue that the form of commitment she describes is a necessary
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form of mediation between the reasons of agents occupying the same body at different
times. I will consider an argument that mediating in this manner is necessary for the
efficacious pursuit of our ends, and therefore required by the constitutive features of
agency. I will show that this argument is unsuccessful in establishing that such a strategy
of diachronic coordination is required to pursue our ends and that, further, such a strategy
will impinge upon autonomy of agents subject to it since it allows the deliberating self to
arbitrarily establish restrictions on the reasons its future self might be motivated by.
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Introduction
Christine Korsgaard has developed a Kantian account of agency that places
sociality at the foundation of all rational action. Her account of diachronic action most
vividly portrays this: on Korsgaard's account the self that wills some action at a time and
the self that carries it out at another time are not the same self, even if they share the same
body, except inasmuch as their wills are unified. The selves occupying my body have to
share projects if they are going to get anything done. This is not for Korsgaard just a
thesis about the persistence of personal identity. It plays a crucial role in her argument
that the Categorical Imperative is constitutive of action.
More broadly, Korsgaard takes reasons to be universal or, in her terms, public.
Any reasons aren't just mine, they're yours too and vice-versa. This comes out most
strongly when Korsgaard compares the lack of privacy of reasons with Wittgenstein's
argument against private language. Korsgaard suggests that normativity permeates the
social to such a degree that "by calling out your name, I have obligated you, I have given
you a reason to stop."1 In my life as an agent, I encounter reasons all around me, reasons
that are reasons because others take them to be. It is not merely that reasons are public in
the same way the world is public, there to be found by anyone who would look. Rather,
Korsgaard thinks that reasons result from our reflective endorsement of maxims for
action and so reasons are only to be found in the domain of interacting rational agents. I
will describe her account in somewhat more detail in Section I and then most fully in
Section V, but it is important to bear in mind that Korsgaard thinks normativity is literally
willed into being by rational agents, albeit with certain constraints on what counts as
volition.
1

Korsgaard 1996, 140.
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In the following sections I will attempt to clarify Korsgaard's argument for her
claim that reasons are public in this manner. Korsgaard argues in three steps. The first
two steps of her argument for the publicity of reasons establish a certain kind of public
availability of reasons but do not support her stronger claims that reasons are public in
that they make demands of us by default. The first part of the argument establishes the
claim that my reasons must be formulated in a manner such that they are available to
others by taking on the law-like form of a determinate commitment, thus grounding the
possibility of volitional unity. The second part establishes the claim that there is no basis
on which the incentives on which others with whom I am interacting are operating can be
excluded as potential grounds for my own practical deliberations and that, therefore, there
is no pre-deliberative class of reasons which is uniquely mine. Both of these steps ensure
that public reasons are possible. In the final step, Korsgaard argues that it is necessary for
our reasons to be public since that is the only way to interact and interacting is necessary
for any action at all. Here, Korsgaard claims that in order to cooperate with other agents,
we must deliberate from a standpoint of mutual respect for our capacity to legislate (what
Korsgaard calls our humanity). She then suggests that because, as she shows in the first
step of her argument, all action requires cooperation with at least future selves occupying
one's body we must always act from a respect for humanity and that there is no way of
privately demarcating humanity to respect: it belongs to all agents. Thus, since respect for
humanity requires treating others' reasons as normative for us, we must reason publicly if
we are to act at all. The result is that, much in the same way that through friendship or
marriage each participant takes on the other’s projects as their own, we must take on the
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projects of other human agents as our own because we are constitutively committed to
treat our wills as unified with theirs through our common humanity.
However, a concern arises once Korsgaard has got her argument on the table. She
appeals specifically to the case of diachronic action in order to argue that reasons are
public because diachronic action is inescapable. Her model of public reasoning as shared
deliberation seems like it could not apply in the diachronic case: past and future selves
are not present to each other in a way that would allow them to deliberate together and
come to a shared conclusion which they endorse simultaneously. Therefore, some sort of
policy needs to be in effect governing how, across time, we ensure that we act in a
coherent manner while still respecting the publicity of reasons. In the context of temporal
separation there appear to be only two options: either the past self lets the future self
decide, which undermines the determinacy of commitment which Korsgaard presents as
an essential feature of volition in the first step of her argument or the future self lets the
past self decide, which seems to require that the determinate commitments we create
through our volitions can justifiably preempt the judgments of one’s future selves.
Furthermore, whatever policy binds us across time it must be either one or the other. The
policy in which future self lets the past self decide cannot gain its authority from any past
self’s commitment to it: otherwise, one would antecedently commit the future self to
accepting the authority of antecedent commitment. Thus, if our volitions are determinate
commitments they must be so constitutively: it must be a part of the nature of volition
that it takes the form of determinate commitment.
I will argue that our volitions being determinate commitments cannot, on
Korsgaard’s account, be constitutive of our agency. There is some appeal to the policy of
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treating our volitions as committing us inasmuch as doing so would give us normative
authority to pursue our ends in a temporally extended manner even in spite of preference
shifts which might constitute competing judgments. However, this commitment is not
strictly necessary in order to be able to act. This is most plain, I will argue, when we
consider that we are capable of acting across time even when unanticipated circumstances
place us outside the realm of circumstance in which our commitments tell us what to do.
Since we are finite agents, our capacity to commit ourselves is always limited. If
commitment is necessary for action, then we are frequently failing to act.
The outline of this paper is this: in Section I, I will give an overview of the
foundation of Korsgaard’s account of agency; In Section II, I will present Korsgaard’s
account of public reasons briefly, so that the progression of her argument is clearer. In
Section III, I will present the first step of her argument; In Section IV, I will present the
second step of her argument; In Section V, I will argue a crucial point: that for
Korsgaard, we must unify not only our incentives under principles of volition, but our
principles of volition into a coherent whole. The result is that the unification of wills is an
all-or-nothing affair, even in cases of interpersonal interaction. In Section VI, I will
present the final step of Korsgaard’s argument. Lastly, in Section VII I will consider
whether or not volition is constitutively determinate commitment and argue that it is not.

5

I.

Agency as Self-Constitution
I will begin with Korsgaard's account of non-human animal agency, as it helps

illustrate the way in which Korsgaard thinks our agency is tied up with principles of
action. On Korsgaard's account, animals represent the world through perception in a way
that construes the features of that world as calling for certain responses: "The world as
perceived by the animal is organized around his interests: it consists of the animal's food,
his enemies, his potential mates, and, if he is social, of his fellows, his family, flock, tribe
or what have you."2 Animals possess instincts which manifest as dispositions which lead
it to perceive and respond to the environment in a certain manner, governed by the
function of that animal: the preservation and reproduction of its form.
However, in the case of human beings there is another level at play in the
relationship between our representations of the world and our actions. According to
Korsgaard, we human beings "are aware not only that we desire or fear certain things, but
also that we are inclined to act in certain ways on the basis of those desires or fears."3
This results in what Korsgaard calls reflective distance, the space in which questions of
justification arise. We have to decide whether or not we count the incentives presented to
us by our instincts as reasons. The result is that "instincts no longer determine how we
respond to those incentives, what we do in the face of them."4 Since the instincts no
longer determine our actions, Korsgaard claims we need principles, what she calls
maxims, in order to settle what will count as reasons. These principles replace our
instincts in constituting our form as agents.

2

Korsgaard 2009, 110
Ibid, p. 116
4
Ibid.
3
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Korsgaard argues that there are two aspects to human agency under this
description. First, the principles of action we endorse must take the form of a law. To will
a principle as a law means that when we will that principle we are making ourselves into
a cause which will bring about the goal contained in our principle.5 In order to do this
coherently, we must to will the means to that goal as a part of the action we undertake.
Korsgaard takes these features of actions to be expressions of the fact that the categorical
imperative in the formulation of universal law is constitutive of human action. In other
words, we have to act on principles possessing these features in order to act because on
Korsgaard's account, those very principles form our make-up as agents. This is the
fundamental constitutive norm of human agency, but it is a merely formal constraint. We
must also have particular principles that we adopt directing us at particular ends. This is
the second feature of our agency, tied to our animal nature. The positive content of our
actions must come from outside the formal constraints of our agency. In fact, Korsgaard
claims all our non-moral values come from our incentives, which is to say our instincts.
Thus, as agents we are still working with the materials that our constitutions as animals
provide.
The reason why Korsgaard thinks we need principles is that when the grounds for
action naturally provided for us by instinct fall away in the face of reflective distance, we
need new grounds for action. Since our actions are no longer immediately governed by
our experience of the world as organized around our preservation as animals, we have to
reconstitute ourselves as causes under a different form. However, in the case of human

5

The reason 'being-the-cause-of' is connected with lawfulness on Korsgaard's picture is its Kantian
heritage. In the same way that natural laws define causal relations, the laws we give ourselves are supposed
to define causal relations. When we give ourselves laws we are the cause.
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beings Korsgaard thinks our forms are up to us. Therefore, rather than operating on
instinctive principles of action, we formulate maxims which represent what courses of
action we reflectively endorse. The principles of action we endorse are what constitute us
as agents. The reason why we must endorse principles rather than, say, one-off behaviors
is that Korsgaard thinks there is no other way to constitute one's self as an agent at a time
unless one endorses a principle which is available to all rational agents. It is in her
argument for this claim, the claim that we must act under laws we give ourselves that the
argument for public reasons begins.

II.

The Publicity of Reasons: An Overview
In this section I will provide an overview of Korsgaard's claims that reasons are

public, primarily by considering her discussion of the issue in the chapter "Integrity and
Interaction" from Self-Constitution.
In the chapter "Integrity and Interaction" Korsgaard provides an account of public
reasons, arguing that in interactions with other agents reasons are shared. In the context
of a violent property dispute, Korsgaard illustrates the way the universalization
requirement of the Categorical Imperative differs between private and public accounts of
reasons:
I think I have a reason to shoot you, so that I can get the object. On the private conception
of reasons, universalizability commits me to thinking you also have a reason to shoot me,
so that you can get the object... but on the public conception of reasons, we do not get this
result. On the public conception I must take your reasons for my own.6

Naturally, willing both that I shoot you and that you shoot me in order for me to get the
object produces a practical contradiction and so I cannot will to shoot the other person in
order to obtain the object on a public account of reasons. Korsgaard's claim here boils
6

Ibid, 193
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down to the following: "if personal interaction is to be possible, we must reason together,
and this means that I must treat your reasons, as I will put it, as reasons, that is, as
considerations that have normative force for me as well as you."7
Korsgaard makes stronger assertions later: "We can't choose to treat someone's
reasons as reasons, as considerations with normative force for us... responding to
another's reasons as normative is the default position--just like hearing another's words as
meaningful is the default position."8 It is this stronger articulation of the publicity of
reasons that will be the main issue in this paper.
One important feature of Korsgaard's account is that interaction occurs in all cases
of diachronic action. At minimum, all action across time is a kind of interaction among
successive agents occupying a body. Korsgaard puts the matter quite plainly:
The requirements of unifying your agency internally are the same as the requirements for
unifying your agency with that of others. that's why you have to will universally, because
the reason you act on now, the law you make for yourself now, must be one you can will
to act on again later, come what may, unless you come to see there's a good way to
change it.9

For Korsgaard, diachronic action of any sort requires public reasoning. For, one is not a
united self until after the will is united across the selves occupying one's body and wills
can only be united through the recognition of public reasons. To illustrate, Korsgaard
discusses the scenario of the Russian nobleman.
The Russian nobleman, in his youth, is confronted with a difficulty: while at
present his ideals and values suggest to him that he should redistribute his wealth to
others, he knows that as he becomes older he will become more conservative. He
7

Ibid, 192
Ibid, 202
9
Ibid, 203
8
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undertakes to establish a contract, which he leaves in the control of his wife that will bind
his future self to undertaking the plan of redistribution. On Korsgaard's account, this sort
of behavior can only express a breakdown in volition: the Russian nobleman "expects to
change his mind without a reason."10 Hence, the nobleman cannot be a unified agent in
the undertaking of the wealth redistribution. There is a failure of action present.
Korsgaard describes this failure in different ways: either as the failure of the young
nobleman to take his older self's reasons as his own or as a failure of the older nobleman
to take the young nobleman's reasons as his own. Both are, assuming the young
nobleman's prediction is correct, failing to recognize reasons as public. Thus, for
Korsgaard the very structure of diachronic action requires the publicity of reasons
because interaction requires the publicity of reasons and all diachronic action just is a
kind of interaction.
It is important to note that Korsgaard takes the claim others' reasons have on us to
be defeasible: "[The young nobleman] can decide to disagree with his own future
attitude. But unless he is then prepared to regard his own future attitude as one of
weakness or irrationality, he is not according the reason he himself proposes to act on
right now as having a normative standing."11 If there is reason to doubt another agent as a
rational source with respect to reasons, then I need not take their reasons for my own.
This opens up the question as to what amounts to being mistaken or irrational on
Korsgaard's account. This means that to understand the sense in which Korsgaard wants
there to be a default inclusion of other agents' reasons in my own deliberative process, we
will need to settle her account of the norms of agency. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Korsgaard
10
11

Ibid
Ibid
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takes the fundamental norms of agency to play an important role in grounding the
publicity of reasons, so to even have a full grasp of what Korsgaard means by calling our
reasons public one must understand this feature of her account. The publicity of reasons
is an expression of their universality, which is a result of the fact that agency not only
must comply with the categorical imperative12 but is constituted by reflective
endorsement constrained by it. Korsgaard not only justifies but characterizes the
categorical imperative in terms of the same sociality that underlies not only cooperation
with others, but cooperation with the selves occupying one's body across time. The link is
with efficacy in action, which amounts to efficacy in the formation of unified volitions.
Here we can see the issue that will concern us later in Section VII: exactly how do
our diachronic self-relations work? What are the defeasibility conditions exactly? For
instance, what does it amount to for the Russian nobleman to consider his future attitude
as one of weakness? What role does the Russian nobleman’s anticipation of his older
self’s reasons play in his deliberation? On the one hand, Korsgaard seems to suggest that
the Russian nobleman must cooperate with his future self unless his future self’s
judgment can be seen as irrational. But the only norms governing the rationality of
agency on Korsgaard’s accounts are the norms governing self-constitution. Thus it seems
that the Russian nobleman cannot commit himself to giving his wealth away unless he
thinks that to do otherwise would be in violation of the constitutive norms of agency. Yet,
as we will see in the next section, along the way to arguing for the publicity of reasons,
Korsgaard suggests that commitment is constitutive of volition.

12

Korsgaard thinks that the hypothetical imperative is not a distinct principle from the categorical
imperative, so inasmuch as the features of the categorical imperative are most relevant for her account of
the publicity of reasons, I will only be focusing on it.
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III.

Diachronic Cooperation and the Categorical Imperative

To be an agent for Korsgaard is to be autonomous: to give one's self laws. On
Korsgaard's account the actions we will contain an end goal and the required means to get
at that end goal. An action takes the form of what Kant would call a maxim: "to-do-x-forthe-sake-of-y." This is the general form of any willed maxim. Maxims are principles of
action, and we need maxims because we are reflective: we need to give reasons and
justify when deciding on what to do. The reason we need reasons, according to
Korsgaard, is because our self-consciousness allows us to reflect. Without selfconsciousness, we would be moved to behave as a result of any incentives presented to us
but "it is within the space of reflective distance that the question whether our incentives
give us reasons arises."13 This question arises because the reflective standpoint is one of
justification. Now, in order to provide justification "we need principles, which determine
what we are to count as reasons."14 Without reflectivity, we don't have justification and
so normativity isn't even in the picture yet. But, for Korsgaard we need principles in order
to answer the challenge of justification. Those principles are maxims.
For Korsgaard there are two key features of maxims. First, maxims take the form
of a law. Second, they are universal. To will a maxim as a law means that when we will
that maxim we are making ourselves into a cause which will bring about the goal
contained in our maxim. In order to do this coherently, we will also have to will the
means to that goal as a part of the action we undertake. The maxim that we will in
undertaking an action must also be universal, which is to say that it should be able to be
willed by any and all rational agents. Korsgaard takes both these features of actions to be

13
14

Korsgaard 2009, 116
Ibid
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expressions of the fact that both the hypothetical and categorical imperatives as Kant
described them are constitutive of action. The claim that the categorical imperative is
constitutive of action is crucial in support Korsgaard's ultimate argument that reasons are
public. If actions were not governed by principles, as the categorical imperative demands,
then reasons would not be able to be shared in the first place since there would be no
possibility of multiple agents acting on the same maxim. The generality of the principles
of volition which the categorical imperative demands is precisely what allows for
multiple agents to adopt the same principle and therefore to share their reasons.
Korsgaard, therefore, argues that our maxims must take the form of a universal
law, which is to say that they must conform to the categorical imperative. The maxim
Korsgaard takes as an example is that of going to the dentist to have a cavity filled.
Willing the maxim universally means that "I commit myself to acting as this maxim
specifies -- going to the dentist on the occasion of my appointment --... so long as I still
have both the cavity and the appointment, and unless there is a good reason why not."15
In order to be universal the maxim has to somehow generalize.16 In spite of changing
conditions, I commit myself to acting as the maxim demands assuming the relevant
requirements are met. In this case, one of the relevant requirements is having a cavity.
However, Korsgaard thinks there can be others. This is her motivation for including the
italicized clause. The clause "unless there is a good reason why not" expresses that
maxims we will are what Korsgaard calls 'provisionally universal.'

15

Korsgaard 2006, 61
Korsgaard uses the term 'general' to describe a particular sort of principle which is distinct from universal
principles. This technical use of the term will be irrelevant to our discussion, so my use of it will be that of
ordinary English.
16

13
If it is the case that willing maxims as universal laws is constitutive of action as
Korsgaard claims then in order to will to go to the dentist to fill a cavity I will have to
will my maxim by committing myself to it as a provisionally universal law. But why
should I do that? According to Korsgaard, it is because if I don't will it universally I can't
be said to have made a commitment and if I haven't made any sort of commitment to my
maxim "then I have not really willed anything."17 For instance "it may be that I am really
terrified of the dentist and therefore I am always tempted to find some excuse not to go
when the day arrives. Now if I am prepared to give up the project of going to the dentist
in the face of any consideration whatever that tempts me to do so, then clearly I have not
really committed myself to anything."18 My maxim has to generalize across potential
situations such that it applies to some situations and not others. It has to have determinate
contours that establish when it is appropriate to act in certain ways and when it is not.
Otherwise, it would make no determinate demands and would not amount to a
commitment of any sort. Once my maxim has this universal character it becomes
available to other agents. It is a rule they could potentially follow just as much as I could
since its generality allows it to apply just as well to situations they may find themselves
in. Put another way, it is not limited to just my particular situation because my particular
situation isn't going to persist. In virtue of my maxim's generality it is, in a sense, public
inasmuch as others can follow the same maxim. Korsgaard also argues that unless my
maxim or reason can be available to any other rational agent as a potential normative
standard in this manner, there can be no cases of volitional unity across time. The reason

17
18

Korsgaard 2006, 61
Ibid, 62
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for this is that Korsgaard maintains that "the self is constituted by volition."19 So, "when I
will to go to the dentist on the day of my appointment, I cannot be willing a law that my
future self should go to the dentist, for whether I have a future self depends on whether
that law and others like it are obeyed.”20
This sudden talk of future selves might seem out of place, but its appearance here
is quite natural. Korsgaard can best demonstrate that our maxims must be available to
other agents by demonstrating that even when our volitions do not stray any further than
home-base (our body) they are required to be available to other agents. Otherwise, a
counterexample to her contention that all maxims are available in this manner would be
cases where I will a maxim such that I only need to directly involve myself in following it
and it seems that many candidates would be available if I had an independently persisting
self. If all cases of action require maxims to take the form of universal laws then it is
crucial that future agents occupying my body cannot be identified with me prior to their
taking on my volitions as their own.
Let's try and make this a little clearer. If I will to go to the dentist to get a cavity
filled, this decision is going to be prospective because the action I undertake will need to
be carried out during some period of time after the action has been willed. But the agents
responsible for carrying out that action can't be the same as me prior to their following
through on the same willed maxim since our being the same agent depends on being able
to share in our wills. Thus when I intend to go to the dentist I have to will a maxim,
giving my action a form such that it is available to another agent as standard that that

19
20

Ibid, 64
Ibid
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agent can either reject or conform to. If I will my maxim only for myself, then I can't truly
will it because I would not be able to coherently intend it to be followed through over a
period of time. I would not be willing it for the future agents occupying my body.
Actually, it's not just future agents occupying my body that I need to be concerned about,
it's also myself. Korsgaard holds that willing maxims universally is not just necessary in
order to establish the identity of agents across time, it is necessary in order to establish
the unity of any given agent at one time.21 It is only through identifying with a law in the
form of a maxim that allows me to constitute myself as an agent distinct from the
impulses that would otherwise determine my behavior. The maxim not only secures the
possibility for commitment given alterations in my incentives and motivations across
time, it secures the possibility for commitment now in spite of competing incentives and
motivations.
Korsgaard holds that willing maxims universally is not just necessary in order to
guarantee the diachronic unity of agency, it is necessary in order to guarantee the
synchronic unity of the agent as well. It is only through identifying with a law in the form
a maxim that I can constitute myself as an agent distinct from the impulses that would
otherwise determine my behavior. The maxim not only secures the possibility for
commitment given alterations in my incentives and motivations across time, it secures the
possibility for commitment now in spite of competing incentives and motivations. If I did
not identify with a principle in contrast to my inclinations, then it seems like there are
two possibilities. First, that I do not identify with a principle because I don't have one, in
which case it seems like I am not operating reflectively at all and cannot be taken to be a
21

It's more accurate to say that willing maxims universally is necessary in order to establish the existence
of an agent, since for Korsgaard agents constitute themselves by willing.
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full-blooded human agent. For, in order to totally avoid willing a maxim I will have to
simply and straightforwardly act by following some particular inclination since my
inclinations are the only other available source of action. Second, that I treat the
principle as distinct from me, in which case Korsgaard claims that I would effectively be
turning it into "another force" equivalent to my competing incentives.22 This leaves me
still to choose, among the options, how I identify.
What is important to take away from this discussion is that for Korsgaard it is a
constraint on a willed maxim that it be willed universally. So, if my maxim does not
universalize, it cannot coherently be the endorsement of a reason. Another way of putting
the constraint is as follows: I can only will to do x for some reason if I could will that
anyone do x for that reason. The next step in Korsgaard's argument for the publicity of
reasons is to argue that since agents must constitute their identities according to
principles of a universal form, the reasons I endorse when I will a maxim are public. We
have to transition from a universalization of reasons that are private, where endorsing that
toothaches are reasons for going to the dentist means when I have a toothache I have a
reason to take myself to the dentist and when you have a toothache you have a reason to
take yourself to the dentist, to a universalization of reasons that are public, where
endorsing that toothaches are reasons for going to the dentist means that when you have a
toothache it is also a reason for me to take you to the dentist and vice-versa23.
There is an ambiguity here which we will have to concern ourselves with once
we’ve reached the standpoint of public reasoning. Maxims may be a kind of commitment,
22

Korsgaard 2009, 75
Of course, it doesn’t have to be an overriding reason. Plus, considerations about how to divvy up labor
among our public reasons may prevent counterintuitive results such as the suggestion that we handle any
tasks on our own.
23
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a law which governs how I behave if a particular situation occurs, but I may interact with
those that endorse different maxims. What is ambiguous is whether or not the
commitment that Korsgaard thinks is essential for maxims is a commitment to the maxim
or a commitment to act a certain way insofar as I endorse the maxim. She seems to talk
as if in the diachronic case, it is something like the former whereas in the case of
interpersonal deliberations with other agents she can only mean the latter since I will
have to come to a shared decision with the agents I interact with which takes into account
my maxims and theirs, and which may involve the endorsement of some other maxim.
The concern to be dealt with in Section VII is whether or not Korsgaard can treat the
diachronic case distinctly from the interpersonal case.
Before I proceed to the next section, it is also worth commenting on the
relationship between the example of the toothache and the Russian Nobleman. When
Korsgaard argues for that volition requires determinate commitment, she seems to be
addressing cases of temptation and attempting to show how succumbing to temptation
involves some form of what she calls ‘particularistic willing’. Particularistic willing is the
identification with a particular instance of inclination (for instance, fear) rather than a
maxim with the form of a universal law. On the other hand, the Russian Nobleman case is
not one of temptation, or at least need not be, as the shift in preferences between the
nobleman’s younger and older self is presumed to be an enduring one and, further, the
older Nobleman’s views about property are based not on a devotion to local impulse, but
to a conscious self-preservation or greed. It is presumable that the older nobleman is
working from a set of maxims that he endorses. However, the Russian Nobleman is a
case in which it seems much more apparent that the past and future selves are different
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people and so seems more intuitively to be a case of interpersonal rather than
intrapersonal relations. In the final section of this paper, I will consider a case which does
not involve particularistic willing but which involves an endorsement of a maxim which
competes with the maxim willed by the past self, yet is not as intuitively interpersonal as
the Russian Nobleman case. The question will be: whether or not Korsgaard’s claims
about the way in which volition commits us can have implications for cases outside of
particularistic willing24. Given her talk of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ reasons, it sounds as though
she thinks that our maxims commit our future selves even when they do not will
particularistically (since such willing does not produce genuine reasons). Examining such
a case more closely, I will argue, shows that our volitions cannot do so if reasons are
public.
In the next section I will consider Korsgaard's second step in her argument for the
publicity of reasons as presented in the Chapter "Integrity and Interaction." This
argument should help supplement her arguments that the categorical imperative is
constitutive of action, making clear why the constraints of interaction demand a
universalization of public reasons rather than a universalization of private reasons.

IV.

The Argument from Deliberative Neutrality
The argument presented in "Practical Reason and Unity of the Will" constrains

the form of the reasons that we can will according to the categorical imperative, namely
24

It might be that this is all Korsgaard wants to show: that commitment just preempts particularistic
willing. I don’t think her arguments in Self-Constitution would bear out this reading, though it is possible.
However, if particularistic willing is impossible (which Korsgaard claims) it is unclear how commitment
could exclude it. Perhaps the fact that volitions are commitments is just a way of expressing that they can’t
be particularistic. In which case, it is unclear why Korsgaard cashes out the sense of commitment she is
talking about in terms of maxims ruling out reasons. Only wills give reasons, and particularistic willing is
impossible. Furthermore, Korsgaard suggests that the example bad reasons that she lists might be
controversial, but never specifies the criteria for what might count as a bad reason. If reasons produced by
particularistic wills were bad reasons, doing so would be straightforward.
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that they take the form of a law which, in virtue of its general nature, can be taken on by
other agents in a united will. This is not, however, a complete account of the publicity of
reasons. As Korsgaard considers in "Integrity and Interaction", the universal form of
maxims seems consistent with an account of reasons that is essentially private. This
would imply that even when I take having a toothache to be a reason for me to go to the
dentist, other people's toothaches aren't reasons for me to take any action (though I might
will a maxim that would suggest that). In contrast, Korsgaard claims that if reasons are
public then my willing our example maxim commits me willing that you should go to the
dentist. If I take a toothache to be a reason to go the dentist, I take it to be a reason in a
public manner: binding for everyone. The implication here is that I am bound to help you
go to the dentist when you have a toothache. Of course, there are many, many other
competing reasons which may override this reason, but your toothache is still a reason
which makes demands of me as much as it makes demands of you.
Korsgaard's argument that reasons are public in this manner appeals to the fact
that she takes human agents to constitute their own identities. Since human agents must
reflectively endorse a principle in order to constitute their agency, there is no identity of
the agent to speak of prior to the endorsement of some principle. Korsgaard thinks this
fact means that there is no basis on which reasons could be grouped into 'mine' and
'yours' when engaging in practical deliberation. Here is the argument:
We constitute our own identities. So what counts as me, my incentives, my reasons, my
identity, depends on rather than precedes, the kinds of choices I make. So I can't just
decide I will base my choices only on my own reasons: because that category--the
category of incentives that counts as mine and from which I construct "my reasons"--gets
its ultimate shape from the choices that I make.25
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The idea appears to be something like this: maxims pick out what incentives count as
reasons, but there is no class of incentives that would count as mine prior to establishing
what maxims I endorse. Therefore, I can't pick out ones that will be 'mine' as opposed to
'yours'.
This seems convincing, but it doesn't seem to quite establish a way of counting
reasons that is universal. For perhaps there is no set of reasons which is definitively firstpersonal from my perspective as an agent, but that doesn't prevent me from arbitrarily
picking out certain incentives on the basis that they arise, say, from my particular body.
Korsgaard considers this concern and gives a response in a footnote:
Suppose I call my body 'Korsgaard' and I decide that I am going to attend only to the
reasons arising directly from Korsgaard's thoughts and experiences, or something along
those lines. That seems possible. But then I would have to be prepared to will it as a
universal law that I should attend only to those reasons even if I turned out not to be
Korsgaard.26

The universal form of the laws that I will dictate that, while I can pick out a set of
incentives that are restricted to particular embodied agents, the self which is to carry out
the law I will cannot be arbitrarily restricted in this manner. In other words, the agent to
which the incentives count as reasons can never be restricted to particular creatures,
bodies or what-have-you. The agential self which carries out the maxim is identified with
that maxim and so prior to its formation there is nothing to identify it with outside of the
mere form of rational agency. Hence, whether or not Korsgaard is an agent in her own
body, when she wills a maxim that takes the incentives originating in 'Korsgaard' as
reasons, she is bound to take them as reasons.
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It should be apparent that we are not, at this stage in Korsgaard's argument, to the
publicity of reasons. Korsgaard wants the default to be that we treat others' reasons as
normative for us, but we aren't there yet. Before we reach the final step of her argument
for this conclusion, I want to consider an ambiguity on Korsgaard's account of agency: it
is not at all clear how another's reasons ever could be normative for me if my identity is
just constituted by the principle I endorse. I will only have the same reasons as another if
we endorse the same principle. However, in virtue of endorsing the same principle,
Korsgaard's commitment to the view that agents are only identified with the principles of
action they endorse renders the result that we are no longer distinct agents. So, we ought
to get clear on just what Korsgaard is going to want to argue for when she claims that
others’ reasons are binding on me by default. I will consider this issue in the following
section, showing why Korsgaard must claim that the publicity of reasons can only result
from a wholly shared volitional identity.

V.

Pluralities of Agents and Pluralities of Principles
When considering what it means on Korsgaard's constitutive account of agency,

to be bound by another's reasons we may want to ask another question: to what degree is
it necessary to endorse the same principles as another agent in order to count as sharing
reasons? For, in response to the all-or-nothing way in which we posed the difficulty, we
might object something along the following lines: you and I can share in our reasons
without being the same agent inasmuch as we mutually endorse a particular maxim, say
the maxim of going to the dentist in case of a toothache. However, we also have many
other maxims which we endorse which allow us to be distinct. While this will not get us
to Korsgaard's claim that others reasons are normative to us by default it will allow us to
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coherently conceive of others' reasons as normative for us in cases where we endorse
some number of identical maxims.
I do not think this is a feasible response. The most significant problem with it is
that it creates a problem which Korsgaard's account of agency does not have the
resources to answer. Suppose that you and I endorse a plurality of principles, some of
which overlap. What allows us to say that a certain set of those principles is mine and the
other set is yours? We have to proceed very cautiously here for, on Korsgaard's account,
there is no agential identity prior to endorsement. Agents are identified with the
principles they endorse. One might have the kneejerk response: well, fine then, I am
identified with this plurality and you are identified with that plurality. This still implies
that there is some way to index an 'I' and a 'you' that underlies each plurality, attaches to
them, to make them distinct. But as Korsgaard has to insist in her argument that reasons
are public, we don't have the resources for that. The only way to identify agents is by
their principles and prior to the act of endorsement there is no 'me' and 'you' to which
principles could be divvied up.27 Put another way, it doesn't seem as though on
Korsgaard's account we can cogently talk about pluralities of principles all endorsed by
one agent. In such a situation we would merely have a plurality of agents, each identified
with each individual principle which has been endorsed. Thus a case of partial unity of
will, a sort of overlap, will be impossible.

27

This flies in the face of claims Korsgaard makes, especially in Chapter 10, which suggest that we can
each have distinct practical identities. My arguments here are to show that, if she wants to hold this, she is
going to have to appeal to resources beyond the bounds of what her account in Self-Constitution possesses
and that she will have to be very careful to distinguish what allows our identities to be distinct in a way that
does not provide a criteria for the private reasoner to then refuse her assertion that there are no criteria of
identity that would demarcate private reasons from the deliberative standpoint.
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Fortunately, Korsgaard is not stuck with an account of agency which will leave us
all a large jumble of agents each operating on a distinct principle. Korsgaard takes the
unity of agency to be central to her account and thus the obvious response for her is that
when we will a plurality of maxims, we will them as a single maxim. That is to say, so
long as we are taking them as normative for ourselves, the set of reasons they determine
will all be normative for us simultaneously. If the agent is identified only with the
principle it has endorsed, and we pick out the principle in terms of the action-reason pairs
which it makes normative then the simultaneous normativity of a set of reasons which
could be described in terms of a plurality of principles really is, from the agential
standpoint, only one principle. This might seem like a view we would want to resist,
since it seems natural to talk about a plurality of principles of action (after all, we don't
cite every reason we've got when we explain why we've gone to see the dentist, just our
toothache). All I can say is that Korsgaard will not want to resist it for fear of
decomposing agency into a disunified jumbled of principles. It's also worth pointing out
that our natural way of talking could just as easily treat the sorts of principles we are
inclined to talk about as really being a plurality of principles. For instance, the maxim "I
will go to the dentist when I have a toothache" could be decomposed into a plurality of
principles: "I will go to the dentist when I have a toothache on Monday and I will go to
the dentist when I have a toothache on Tuesday and etc..." Sometimes, this is the level at
which we talk, especially if someone is puzzled as to why we went to the dentist at a
particular time. There may still be something to be said about our common ways of
describing action justifications at certain levels, but the issues here are too weighty for
Korsgaard's account of agency for features of our language to be convincing without

24
further argument that our principles typically have certain 'natural sizes' aligning with
common discourse.
All of this will lead us to a conclusion Korsgaard wants to endorse, though it is
not quite the strongest form of the publicity of reasons. Korsgaard claims that
interpersonal interactions, cases of cooperative agency, require the cooperating agents to
treat each other's reasons as normative. This is because she takes cases of interaction to
involve a unification of wills. If the unification of wills cannot be partial, as the above
considerations seem to suggest, then unifying my will with someone else's means taking
on board all of their reasons and vice-versa. There will be no way to pull apart just some
principles and leave the rest. All of the other agent's reasons must come aboard. If
diachronic action involves interaction with other agents, then it will be the case that we
are also tasked with this project of unification. The difference is that my future selves
don’t exist yet, and so I cannot actively negotiate in order to reach some agreed,
mediating principle that will govern our shared activity. The result is that self-governance
will have to occur according to some principle that allows for the coherence of our
actions across time in spite of our limited capacities to negotiate or to anticipate the
reasons our future selves have. This principle will have to fall out of the constitutive
norms of agency. Were it optional it would be possible that my later self would not
endorse it, and then I would need to mediate between the principle of diachronic selfgovernance I endorse and the one my later self endorses and I could not appeal to the
same policy. Whatever new policy I appeal to would have to be non-optional or the same
problem would result. This is the conundrum I will consider in Section VII.
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Now, it seems like the path to getting the strong sense in which reasons are public
is becoming clearer. Korsgaard needs to establish two things: that all interaction must
involve a unification of wills, second that the interactive stance is necessary in order to
will. In the next section I will present Korsgaard's argument in favor of both these claims.

VI.

The Final Step
Korsgaard's argument that the interaction of agents always involves the

unification of wills rests on the claim that interaction "depends on the possibility of
shared deliberation."28 It is the possibility of shared deliberation that Korsgaard claims
depends on the public status of reasons. Without the possibility that reasons can possess a
normativity that "can extend across the boundaries between people"29 interaction would
be impossible.
Korsgaard gives a number of concrete examples to illustrate what she has in mind.
The first example she gives is that of a student and teacher organizing a time to meet. The
student and teacher have different constraints on when they could meet. For instance, the
teacher can meet right after the class in which she teaches the student but the student has
a class immediately afterwards and so cannot meet at that time. Since the act of meeting
is a mutual one, Korsgaard wants to claim that teacher and student must deliberate
together and so must share reasons.
Korsgaard rejects one possibility: one in which the teacher retorts to the student
that she just needs to skip the class which interferes with the suggested meeting time.
Korsgaard dismisses this case very quickly as a case in which interaction does not occur
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at all. Certainly, the student and teacher are not deliberating together in this case. Further,
they are only acting together inasmuch as the student acquiesces and takes the teachers'
reasons to be normative, thereby abandoning treating class attendance as a reason not to
meet at the time the teacher requires. When the student acquiesces there is still a
unification of wills and still a sense in which mutual deliberation occurs, that deliberation
can only result in the student abandoning a previously endorsed principle, however.
Despite Korsgaard's brevity I think her evaluation is correct.
However, as Korsgaard indicates, this is a bit extreme of the teacher. There does
seem to be a middle ground: "I could take your reasons into account, not as public
reasons with normative implications for me, but as private ones with normative
implications for you, implications which bear on my predictions of how you are going to
act."30 Korsgaard has a somewhat winding argument for why interactions cannot involve
this sort of approach. I see no reason not to grant her claim, given that she takes
interaction to be a kind of cooperative action and if she shows that cooperative action is
the default for agency, then it won't matter what we call it: the default will be treating
others’ reasons as normative. However, I describe this middle-ground approach to
negotiations because it is the last vestige of the private reasoner that Korsgaard considers
as a live possibility. By the time Korsgaard begins her final argument for the publicity of
reasons, she is considering the following option: the advocate of private reasons admits
that, yes, when engaging in cooperation agents must mutually take their reasons as
normative and thus share their reasons with one another but surely it's the case that I can
still choose to cooperate or not. After all, then, it is a matter of choice whether or not I
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count others reasons as normative for me and so reasons aren't public: they are private
but, perhaps, shareable when we decide to unite our wills in a cooperative enterprise.31
Korsgaard's argument against the optional nature of shared reasons rests on an
argument that the act of identifying with a principle you have willed requires respecting
one's own humanity and that 'humanity' is not a private thing such that one could respect
it only in one's self, in some sort of private fashion. In arguing this, she appeals to issues
in both the first and second steps of her argument: agential unity at a time requires a
commitment to a principle that can be borne out across agents and that from the
standpoint of one's bare agency, someone capable of reflectively endorsing principles or
one's humanity, there is no way of picking out a particular 'me' in contrast to 'you' that
would restrict my respect for humanity.
Let's consider the first part of this argument. Korsgaard has already argued that all
action involves interaction. So she returns to the scenario of the Russian nobleman, who
must either coerce his future self or cooperate with it, unifying his will with it, in order to
carry out his maxim though only one of these options will allow the Russian nobleman to
truly act in a diachronic manner. At the culmination of her argument, Korsgaard appeals
to the diachronic case in order to show that interaction, which she has argued requires
respect for humanity and therefore volitional unity, cannot be opted out of if we are to act
at all. It is only through cooperating that we are capable of carrying out an action. Thus,
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It is an interesting point that, given Korsgaard's view of agential identity, the fact that agents can unite
wills and share reasons isn't actually a result of the public status of reasons. For, those reasons are only
shared after the agents reflectively endorse the exact same principle, making them identical from an
agential perspective. This still allows for the possibility that there can be reasons private to groups with
united wills. Hopefully this makes clear why Korsgaard needs the stronger claim that reasons are normative
by default for all agents. The reasons have to be shared before and not after deliberation. In other words,
the demand that they be shared must be a constitutive feature of agency.
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Korsgaard thinks that in order to act at all, we have to legislate publicly and endorse
maxims in a way that treats their reasons as normative for other agents. If the Russian
nobleman does not treat his reason as normative for his future self, as a law, then
Korsgaard argues the Russian nobleman can't possibly be respecting his own humanity.
This is because one's humanity is one's status as an agent capable of legislating about
reasons in the first place. But this normativity must be public; otherwise the Russian
nobleman cannot unify himself under it, whether at a time or across time. However,
because the normativity of reasons is public it is not just the young Russian nobleman
who legislates. If the older nobleman is rational, he also legislates with just as much
normative authority. As a result, if the young nobleman is not committed to seeing his
older self as rationally incompetent, he must respect the reasons he anticipates his older
self to have. As Korsgaard puts it, he must either be at war with his older self or married
to it.32
Korsgaard is now making a different argument than the argument she initially
made to support her claim that the categorical imperative is constitutive of agency, which
instead leads to the conclusion that agency requires public reasons in the sense that those
reasons are binding to later selves despite sharing the same basic appeal to the need for
cooperation in diachronic agency. We might imagine the private reasoner resisting:
certainly the young nobleman could treat his older selves' reasons as normative but that's
up to the young nobleman. But the young nobleman doesn't have to. The twist in the
diachronic case that Korsgaard adds is an appeal to humanity. Korsgaard wants to argue
that the right the young nobleman has to form a will of his own depends on treating
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himself with respect, and treating himself with respect means treating his older self with
respect.
So the situation is something like this: why not think that the private reasoner is
committed to endorsing principles when acting but not to endorsing them publicly, that is
as normative for her later selves? Well, she certainly must treat it as normative for her
now. On what basis does she treat it as normative for her now? Because she respects her
humanity, she treats herself as having a legitimate claim to legislating normativity into
existence through volition. Two results are supposed to follow: most straightforwardly,
inasmuch as she regards her future selves as also possessing humanity and thereby
capable of volitional legislation, her respect for their humanity follows from a respect for
her own humanity. Respecting hers but disrespecting theirs would be an inconsistency,
and worse, incoherent according to Korsgaard. That would require distinguishing
different 'possessors' of humanity, but from the deliberative standpoint Korsgaard has
established that there is no 'I' or 'You' since no principles are as yet endorsed and so no
agents are constituted. Thus, she must at least treat her future selves’ reasons as
normative for her. Less straightforwardly, since she recognizes that the humanity of her
future selves warrants their legislation over her will she also recognizes that her humanity
warrants her legislation over their will. However, the legislation of a will must ultimately
be unified, or no action is possible. Thus, mutual recognition of reasons is necessary in
order to arrive at a will that is not inconsistent with itself.
The result is that, as I have gestured at above, in a certain sense Korsgaard thinks
all interaction is like marriage or friendship, at least inasmuch as it requires a certain
volitional attitude of reciprocity: "friends exchange their private projects of pursuing their
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own happiness, each undertaking to care for the other's happiness instead of his own."33
Now, this is not a reciprocity that can be strictly understood as a kind of mutual selfeffacement aiming at another's good because on Korsgaard's picture friendship is going to
result in the formation of a unified will: "I pledge myself to pursue my friend's happiness,
but her happiness in turn includes my own; she pledges herself to pursue my happiness,
but mine now includes hers."34 Preserved in the relationship is also the commitment to
one's own happiness, albeit only through this reciprocal relationship. Korsgaard thinks,
therefore, that "the exchange produces something new, a shared object, our happiness."35
This is the structure of interaction for Korsgaard, not just for friendship or marriage, but
for any interaction I undertake with another agent. Since it is central to Korsgaard's
argument that interaction is necessary, this means that diachronic interaction is also
something like friendship or marriage: it involves a mutual commitment to each other's
projects36. It is also a shared deliberation.
The structure of this account of volition thus underlies the fact that Korsgaard
specifically insists in Chapter 4 (the first step of her argument) that maxims take the form
of provisionally universal laws. A provisionally universal law is a law with a universal
form but which incorporates exceptions into itself. To reiterate Korsgaard’s example
formulation of a provisionally universal law: "I commit myself to acting as this maxim
33
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do in friendship. While it may still be true in Korsgaard's account that facts about one's embodiment allow
one to undertake the support of one's friends' projects in a more efficacious way, I think there are reasons to
think that she really does think we need to be committed to the projects of anyone we interact with. The
reasons to think this include the arguments I made in Section IV that the unification of a will cannot be
partial as well as the fact that Korsgaard does explicitly claim that others reasons are always normative for
us by default (this is, after all, how she characterizes their publicity). Korsgaard also explicitly states that
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specifies -- going to the dentist on the occasion of my appointment --... so long as I still
have both the cavity and the appointment, and unless there is a good reason why not.”37
Korsgaard compares this to the provisional nature of our workaday understanding of
physical laws38, which we stipulate in a provisional manner and revise with a greater
degree of specificity after observing exceptions39. However, the provisional nature of
maxims has its source in the structure of cooperative action. Since this structure involves
shared deliberation, deliberation with shared reasons, it is best to understand the
provisional status of maxims as accounting for potential changes in the normative
landscape that would call for renegotiation of the maxim. With a physical law, future
experiences might make us realize the inadequacy of our formulation as a description of
the world or as a predictor of future events. With the laws of our will, what we might fail
to anticipate are reasons we have yet to consider or encounter that would lead us to revise
our deliberation.
This comes out most clearly in the case of diachronic action. If the binding force
of an agent’s maxim derives from a respect for humanity, that is to say the legislative
authority present in any reflective agent, then when legislating it seems like an agent
can’t just dictate to her future selves how to act. She must also take into consideration her
future selves’ reasons, just as the reason she brings into being with the willing of her
maxim must be taken on by future selves. This non-dictatorial, yet legislative attitude
finds expression in the provisionality of maxims.
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Yet, there is a tension. Korsgaard wants the universality of maxims to explain the
way in which our volitions are binding for our future selves. Inasmuch as maxims are
laws, they keep us committed to a determinate principle of action and avoid leaving us a
disorganized bundle of impulses. Hence the manner in which Korsgaard gives the
provisionally universal form of willed maxims through the clause ‘unless there is a good
reason why not.’ After all, “we are aware that certain unexpected circumstances could
arise, circumstances that would give us good reason not to do it.”40 Important here is the
distinction between good and bad reasons not to follow through on the action. If there
aren’t bad reasons to avoid going to the dentist, then the maxim no longer amounts to any
sort of commitment. Korsgaard is insistent that the structure of volition is commitment,
that commitment requires determinacy and that, therefore, I am not willing if "all I am
doing on Monday when I commit myself to going to the dentist on Tuesday is
committing myself to doing whatever I will decide to do on Tuesday regardless of my
decision on Monday."41 I am going to argue that Korsgaard cannot both think that we
commit in this manner and that reasons are public in the sense that she has argued. This
has more significant consequences than the construction of more theoretical scaffolding
in order to distinguish how we reason diachronically, in an intrapersonal manner, rather
than synchronically in an interpersonal manner. Korsgaard appeals to the diachronic case
in her final argument for the publicity of reasons: our reasons must be public, binding
universally, in order for us to undertake diachronic action. If the kind of interaction I
have with future selves occupying my body is different in significant ways from the kind
of interaction I have with other selves in other bodies then she can no longer
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straightforwardly appeal to the diachronic case in order to establish the publicity of
reasons in the interpersonal case.
The idea, then, is that the agent initially willing the maxim anticipates that their
future self might have good reason for acting otherwise, but still stipulates what would be
a bad reason to opt out. If this is the picture of the provisionally universal form of the
maxims we will and, therefore, of the way we unify our wills with others cooperatively
there are complications for Korsgaard's account. In the next and final section I will
explore these difficulties by looking at diachronic cases of cooperation. Before I begin I
want to make clear what is at stake in the following section. The aim will be to
understand in what sense, if any, Korsgaard can preserve the determinacy of particular
commitments such as expressed in volitions to make visits to the dentist, while still
arguing that we must reason publicly. Here is the difficulty we will be concerned with:
Korsgaard argues that interaction requires the unification of the will with those we
interact with, requiring a kind of shared deliberation; Korsgaard also argues that in order
to act at all, we must interact with future selves occupying our body, unifying our wills
with them; because we are neither omniscient nor prescient, we do not know what our
future self's will would be; the only way we can secure the possibility of volitional
unification, then, is either for the past self to let the future self decide or for the future self
to let the past self decide; if the future self must let the past self decide, then it must be
because of a constitutive norm of action; if it cannot be established that the past self has
authority over the future self as a result of constitutive norms of action, then the past self
must let the future self decide; the past self letting the future self decide requires an
abandonment of the determinate commitment Korsgaard describes in Chapter IV and thus
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requires rejecting the treatment of our past volitions as peremptorily binding. My main
purpose is to work through a tension that ultimately amounts to an inconsistency in
Korsgaard’s argument in Self-Constitution, albeit one which I do not think ultimately
prevents Korsgaard’s account from being coherent. Since I will argue that it is not a
constitutive norm of agency that our volitions be commitments, I will also have shown
that Korsgaard can jettison those claims without undermining her account of agency.
However, those that find Korsgaard’s ability to account for something like the stability of
intention important, especially as support for her account of volition, will find the
arguments in Chapter IV thereby weakened.

VII.

Anticipating Reasons

Consider Korsgaard's example of the student and teacher trying to coordinate a
meeting. In the version where the teacher acts as a private reasoner, the teacher tells the
student to simply skip the class which conflicts with the proposed meeting time. She is
not treating the student's reason not to skip class as a reason when scheduling the
meeting. Now let's put a different spin on the scenario: the teacher is not reasoning
privately, and thus does treat some of the student's reasons as good ones. Suppose the
student has to pick up her siblings from school, and so the teacher suggests a different
time. The teacher takes that to be a good reason not to meet at the suggested time.
However, the teacher does not consider competing classes to be good defeaters in their
shared practical deliberations. She proposes a maxim, dictating when they will meet, and
stipulates that competing classes are bad reasons to opt out of the action proposed by the
maxim.
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On the other hand, this scenario seems consistent with Korsgaard's description of
the way we commit ourselves to a determinate course of action through volition. She
seems to treat the intrapersonal diachronic case distinctly from the interpersonal case.
Yet, to do so seems in conflict with how she describes the public nature of reasons: it is
not up to the teacher to simply discount certain reasons the student has and likewise in the
intrapersonal case of the Russian Nobleman. The teacher cannot disrespect the humanity
in her student that allows her to legislate reasons nor can the young nobleman disregard
the reasons of his older self. Presumably, the teacher/young nobleman can only discount
the student's/old nobleman’s reasons if they can't be legislated from the standpoint of
humanity at all, that is to say: they are immoral42. However, Korsgaard seems to describe
the stipulations made in maxims as to what might be good or bad reasons not to go to the
dentist in this dictatorial manner: one stipulates that being afraid is a bad reason. It is
clear that this can't be what one does, strictly speaking, for to do so would be to fail to
reason publicly: if fear is a reason for my future self then I cannot fail to treat it as a
reason. The examples Korsgaard gives of 'bad reasons' in the case of the trip to the dentist
do not seem like they need to be immoral. Backing out of dentist trips due to anxiety or
fear may produce a less pleasant world when universalized, but there doesn't appear to be
any contradiction in willing such a maxim universally. Perhaps they would, but due the
ambiguity with which Korsgaard presents examples it is still an open question whether
the provisional universality of a maxim is constrained by morality or by something more
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Korsgaard takes morality to fall out of the public status of reasons. Reasons are public because when I
legislate (or when anyone legislates) the resulting reasons become normative for all humanity. But certain
actions can't be willed for all humanity because they produce a contradiction in the will when legislated
from this standpoint. I will be presuming that Korsgaard has successfully argued for public reasons and,
therefore, morality. Since my concerns are with the internal coherence of her arguments, she or a defender
could appeal to morality without begging the question or reasoning in a circular manner.
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particular, like our practical identities. The latter certainly seems to fit one sense in which
we often take ourselves to think of how we're committed. As a teacher, one might not
think that a cold is sufficient reason not to be teaching, while perhaps an auditor might
think that a cold is a good reason for not attending class. It is not necessarily a matter of
morality for the teacher, though it might be. It could just be a part of her sense of
commitment to her students.
One way to characterize this commitment is to think of it in terms of a certain
kind of authority, albeit one that only results from an agreement to a particular way of
conducting one's self. As I mentioned earlier when discussing the student/teacher
negotiation over when to meet, the student might just unify wills with the teacher, thereby
making it possible to interact by ceding authority to the teacher to make the decision of
when to meet and regarding what reasons are good or bad ones for meeting at particular
times. Of course, the teacher can't expect the student to do this unless she has a legitimate
claim, in both their eyes, to this sort of authority. That is to say both must reflectively
endorse the teacher's status as authoritative in this manner.
Appealing to a policy like this in the diachronic case seems like a way to preempt
the concern about the tension the deliberating self is in when legislating for its future self.
We might argue that in the case of diachronic action, the deliberating self has a claim to
authority over the reasons of the future self. The argument might run something like this:
we need commitment in order to have volition. We need volition in order to act. The only
way to get commitment is if I cede authority to the volition of my past self. However,
because we are first and foremost committed to public reasons and thereby committed to
taking the reasons of all rational agents into consideration in our deliberations, in order to
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successfully establish that this structure of diachronic mediation is warranted Korsgaard
will need to argue that we are constitutively committed to ceding to the decisions of our
past selves. Thus, if my future self decides not to go to the dentist because he is afraid, he
is thereby making a mistake not just by my lights as the deliberating self, but by his own
lights as an agent. If the argument is not made constitutively, then whether or not my
future self decides to treat my volitions as authoritative is up to him and, as a result, I
cannot genuinely commit him through my volitions.
By now we are familiar with the constitutive features of action according to
Korsgaard: that we make ourselves into the unified causes of the ends we will. Failing to
treat volitions of our past selves as committing us in the present must threaten the
possibility of action, if commitment is to be possible. Here is an argument along those
lines, given in the form of an example:
I find myself on Tuesday, about to go to the dentist and afraid to do so43. I know
that last week I decided I was going to go to see the dentist today. Now, I have all sorts of
decisions I myself have made. For instance, I have decided that I want to see a rare live
show of a foreign musical group, among others. I know that I'll be counting on my future
selves to work with me in carrying out that action. Now, I imagine a future self in my
shoes at the time of the show: it is a foggy night out and, despite it being a short drive
that is relatively safe, that future self is afraid to drive. I know that my decision to see the
show will only get carried out in such a circumstance if my future self treats my volition
43

I want to make it clear that if the agent making the decision regarding whether or not to go to the dentist
would not be trying to will particularistically should the decision be not to go because of fear. The agent
would will the decision as a maxim, legislating fear as a genuine and generalizing reason not to go to the
dentist. In other words, I am not presenting a case of what Korsgaard might consider temptation. I take my
case to be more akin to the Russian Nobleman case (assuming the Russian Nobleman's future self can be
considered rational).
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as committing him, and therefore cedes to me that being afraid is a bad reason not to go
to the show. But I am also in that situation with respect to my past self's volition to go to
the dentist. I surely cannot make an exception of myself, for from the deliberative
standpoint my past self and I are not distinct. If I want my future self to treat my volitions
as committing him, I must treat my past self's volition as committing me as well. If I don't
do so, I know that my capacity to act according to my ends will be jeopardized.
The demand I find myself confronted with in this example is parallel to the
demand to unify myself by willing a maxim. Just as I am faced with a set of incentives
which I must unite under a maxim in order to constitute myself as a unified whole, across
time I may be confronted with a set of maxims which I must unite in order to constitute
myself as a unified whole. I can't just identify with the maxim I have at any present
moment, not now that I am required to deliberate publicly in a diachronic fashion.
Instead, I need to mediate between all the various maxims my future and past selves
might will and they must do likewise. I can do this only by forming some sort of principle
of practical deliberation either to which we all agree or which is necessary in order to
ensure our capacity to act. We will either need to adopt a principle which coherently
governs the way our volitions are treated across time or be constitutively governed by
one. It appears as though if I do not treat volitions as commissive, my capacity to act is
threatened. So in the example given, the argument is that in order to satisfy the demands
of the constitutive norms of agency volitions must be able to peremptorily commit (i.e.
commit me against treating certain reasons as motivating where they conflict with the
willed act).
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Now, it is important to see that because of the nature of the diachronic case, if it
turns out that the past self ceding to the future self is a viable option for conducting
ourselves as agents, then it will be the only option. For, there is no in-between like in the
case of an interpersonal negotiation between two people at a time where a back-and-forth
can establish consensus without requiring any sort of asymmetry. The reason why it must
either be the case that the future self gives say-so to the past self or vice-versa is because
we are committed to treating our past and future selves’ reasons as normative. Now,
suppose I find myself deliberating about how to act and I must decide whether or not I'm
making a commitment that involves overriding certain sorts of reasons my future self
might have, which is to say I'm treating my volition as committing me even in the face of
these reasons. Say I commit myself to going to the dentist even if I'm afraid. My will
must be unified with my future self's will in order to act at a future date, because
otherwise that will be some other agent and not me. So, if my future self refuses to treat
my volition as committing him in this manner, then it will turn out that I have made it
impossible to unify our wills, in the same way that the teacher being dismissive of the
student's reasons prevents shared deliberation. Put another way, I cannot antecedently
commit my future selves to uphold my commitments. This sort of self-authorization is
circular unless it is the only option if I am to act: it must be authorized by the constitutive
features of agency. Not only would an attempt to antecedently commit in this way be
problematically circular, but by failing to accord my future self the same authority to
legislate which I accord myself in virtue of our shared humanity, I actually undermine my
own capacity to self-constitute. Thus, if volition can peremptorily commit in the face of
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future reasons, it is an all-or-nothing affair (which is not to suggest that the commitments
our volitions require of us are not defeasible).
We can draw out the dialectic of the situation by returning to the synchronic case.
Suppose the teacher tries to apply a similar argument: "Look," she says "We have to
come to some decision. Neither of us is budging so I'm just going to make a decision for
us. There's really no choice, for we must figure out some time to meet." The immediate
retort, available to the student, is that while it may be that someone has to make a
decision, it surely doesn't have to be the teacher. "Why can't I be the one to decide?" she
asks. We are certainly in this sort of situation in the diachronic case: someone is going to
have to be the authority; either the past self will have to let the future self decide, or viceversa. Is there a way to choose between the two? Otherwise, nothing is going to be
decided, since they cannot reach out across time in order to negotiate actively.
Here is the answer that the past self will want to give as to why it is not the future
self that can be the authority: suppose I let you, the future self, decide rather than viceversa. Well, that would mean that I could not commit to anything. I might come to a final
conclusion about what seems best for me to do at this particular moment but I could not
really commit to any diachronically extended action, such as going to the dentist next
Tuesday. Not only that, but neither could you, for you are also past self with respect to
some future self. So you would really have to leave it to some future self to decide
whether or not to carry out your decisions. And so the chain goes: you cede to him and he
cedes to his future self and none of us form any commitments to do anything and so none
of us really act. On the other hand, if you let me decide then a similar chain occurs, but
one which strengthens our capacity to accomplish our goals. For you are a past self with
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respect to some future self, and therefore in a position to commit that future self in the
same way I commit you. Granted, many circumstances which we might not anticipate
may lead us to reasonably abandon our commitment, but at least we would be committed
to acting when things go as expected.
Now, the picture the past self paints of a world in which volitions commit us
across time is certainly an appealing one in certain respects and may seem preferable to a
world in which the deliberating self never commits its future selves. In this world, the
past self leaves decisions about action at later times to the future self, which undermines
the determinacy of our particular commitments, or so it would appear. The question of
primary interest is whether or not this indeterminacy of commitment leads to some sort of
incapacity to act effectively. The cost of self-governing in a manner which does not treat
volitions as commissive is, presumably, that we lose the authority to set ends for
ourselves in a manner that allows us to pursue them efficaciously as agents across time.
The trade-off is that my past self has no say about what new ends I set at the present
moment. In a sense, the tension between the two is something like this: if volitions are
commissive, we give up our deliberative authority to set ends for ourselves as a result of
our present evaluation of the reasons that motivate us. If volitions are not commissive, we
find our capacity to pursue the ends we do set in virtue of being unable to maintain them
in the face of redeliberation that we anticipate. We can here see that the issues of
deliberative autonomy and agential efficacy begin to come apart in a way that Korsgaard
does not consider. It is essential, however, to examine which is more fundamental to her
account of agency and to establish how we mediate our deliberations with our future and
past selves. I will now proceed to weigh the costs to the agential norms of autonomy and
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efficacy in these two alternatives for diachronic mediation, beginning with the case in
which our volitions peremptorily commit us in the manner Korsgaard suggests.
One thing to be concerned about if volitions peremptorily commit us is that what
counts as a mistaken practical deliberation is determined only in terms of diachronic
relations between agents. To illustrate this, I will suggest two scenarios: in one, I have
tooth-pain, consider going to the dentist and decide that I am very afraid of dentists and
that I’m not going to go. Now, as time passes this volition will commit my future selves.
Suppose I even stipulate that increased pain would be a bad reason to go to the dentist.
Later, as the pain becomes unbearable, I feel inclined to go to the dentist. Yet, I must
accede to my past self’s volition: I must not go to the dentist. However, in the second
scenario, when I first deliberate I instead decide that the pain is a good reason to go to the
dentist, and my fear a bad reason not to go. In this scenario, my later self is bound by my
volition in the precise opposite way, even as the fear intensifies.44 Outside of the
authority of our past volitions, however, there are no grounds for being mistaken in our
commitments to our maxim. If volitions commit us in this manner, it seems that they
have a very powerful and largely arbitrary say in constituting what would be a mistaken
practical judgment.
While most of us probably would find at least some of these decisions quite
different from the ones we would be inclined to make, there are no constraints in the
resources available to Korsgaard to exclude them. The priorities that our reasons have are

44

One might wonder in what sense I could be the same person and be capable of, hypothetically, making
completely opposite judgments about how I want to act. Of course, from the deliberative standpoint
Korsgaard is committed to not distinguishing between agents at all and, further, to the freedom of the agent
to self-constitute. One might also want to consider just how consistent people are about the way they weigh
considerations from situation to situation.
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totally dependent on the capacities of our deliberating self to stipulate them in its volition
and on the stipulations it in fact makes. The result is that we can only be procedurally
mistaken when we form practical judgments that conflict with judgments expressed in the
volitions of our past selves. This is, of course, consistent with Korsgaard’s account of the
norms of agency if we suppose that volitions are commissive as a constitutive feature of
agency: the norms that govern agency for Korsgaard are procedural or formal norms.
The difficulty with this picture of agency is the way in which it leaves the future
self at the mercy of the past self. Sometimes we feel like our past self was in some way
failing to appreciate the reasons we have, even if they anticipated the situation we find
ourselves in. The perspective through which we are appreciating even the reasons our
past self anticipated is one that self could not have occupied, so why should it be able to
dismiss our perspective? If past volitions do not commit us, we have to give up our right
to demand our future selves carry through the ends we set ourselves. But if we treat past
volitions as able to commit us by preempting our reasons, we give up our right to
exercise our capacities to reflectively endorse the courses of action we take45. Perhaps the
weirdness of this structure of diachronic rationality can be made clearer if look at a case
where the past self has infinite cognitive capacities, such that they can consider every
possible reason to abandon the commitment, and therefore establishes entirely in advance
the contours of the commitment. The result would be that this past self could definitively
and for all time determine how its future selves would be rationally bound to act, even
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Even if we want to insist on the right to redeliberate it doesn’t mean we have to exercise it. The issue
about whether it is resource-efficient or wise to always redeliberate has nothing to do with whether or not
volitions have authority in the face of redeliberation.
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though its commitment could have taken any number of mutually incompatible forms and
therefore would be, in a certain sense, arbitrary.
The case of the cognitively infinite agent also draws out just how drastic the
distinction between intrapersonal and interpersonal cases would have to be. After all,
Korsgaard’s arguments for the publicity of reason definitely commit her to the view that
being able to anticipate and plan out our volitions for all future circumstances does not
allow us to preempt the reasons of agents in other bodies. Yet, supposedly, the
relationship I have to my future and past selves are the same as the relationships I have
with other agents in other bodies, with the exception of the diachronic asymmetries
confronting me in the former cases. It does not seem convincing that the structure of
diachronic reasoning can warrant the sort of procedural constraints on diachronic
practical rationality that have just been outlined. Indeed, something here seems to go
against the whole spirit of the reasoning which was supposed justify the authority of our
past volitions to commit us: it was as a part of a broader policy of mediation between past
and future selves where each self traded full authority over its present course of action in
order to secure the stability of the pursuit of the ends it sets across time. There must be
more to the story of this mediation, then, since the case of the cognitively infinite
deliberating self simply seems to annihilate any independence its future selves might
have, thus making it an empty question whether or not those future selves ought to heed
the deliberating selves’ volitions in order to increase their efficacy. However, it seems
uncertain that Korsgaard will have the resources to flesh out this story and how that
would play out. There would need to be boundaries on the deliberating self’s authority to
deliberate for its future selves, but how those constraints would be established seems
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difficult to ascertain. After all, they cannot be negotiated between selves. Furthermore,
we cannot appeal to a principle in which the deliberating self must somehow respect the
autonomy of the future self. For one thing, this leaves the question as to what degree the
future self needs, minimally, to retain its autonomy. For another (and more
problematically), the entire argument justifying the authority of our past volitions to
commit us establishes that it is constitutive of the capacity of the future self to be an
agent that it accept the commitments of its past selves. Thus, the commitments are not
alien constraints on the autonomy of the future self to begin with.
Now that we have explored the case in which volitions peremptorily commit us,
we can consider whether or not volition which does not commit us peremptorily
undermines action. Is such an agent hindered in pursuing its ends? The answer is less
clear when we consider that, bound by the need to reason publicly, the agent whose
volitions do not peremptorily commit her sets her ends to be her best judgment about
what she ought to pursue at any given time. Her long-term ends (insofar as she is
committed to them) are indeterminate but she is not especially hindered in pursuing them
and can do so until some deliberation leads her to believe that they need adjusting.
Furthermore, they likely have some degree of persistence since we are unlikely, for
reasons of economy, to redeliberate all our ends at all moments. Furthermore, our past
volitions still carry weight as public reasons that will bind us in our deliberations. They
just do not peremptorily bind us.
There does seem to be one thing missing if volitions do not commit us: a general
policy for how to unite our maxims into a coherent and unified will. The demand to
accede to past volitions at least gives us a concrete way to adjudicate between our past
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and present judgments. Otherwise, how is one supposed to decide whether or not my
present judgment, which may conflict with a past judgment, is mistaken or correct?
Actually, this question is just as pertinent to the agent who is bound by past volitions. As
a result of our finite cognitive capacities, our ability to commit through anticipation of
future circumstances is very limited. In many cases, we're just going to have to fly by the
seat of our pants46. The difference between an agent governed by volitions that
peremptorily bind and an agent governed by volitions that don’t is that the latter simply
flies by the seat of her pants all the time. However, we are no more undermined in our
capacity to act diachronically when we encounter unanticipated circumstances than when
we encounter anticipated ones.
Finally, approaching the relationship that I have to my past self's practical
judgments in terms of correctness or incorrectness is simply mistaken itself, even if my
practical judgments are the exact opposite of my past self's. It is mistaken in the same
way that when we enter into shared deliberations with someone with competing practical
judgments, we must assume that one of us is wrong. Inasmuch as Korsgaard is a
constructivist, so long as those judgments are formed according to the constraints of
agency, they are legitimate. It is clear that there is a great deal of wiggle-room to legislate
in the sphere of the non-moral, such that two legitimate but competing judgments could
occur. Indeed, on Korsgaard’s account our practical judgments are acts of selfconstitution in the face of the incentives and reasons we find ourselves faced with, not
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The exception, of course, would be if we were cognitively infinite and capable of planning for every
instance. See above for discussion of such a case.

47
judgments about the reasons we have47. When we encounter someone with competing
judgments, we are both of us forced to find some way to mediate them and form a new
judgment about how we are to act together while according each other's reasons weight.
In other words, we are to self-constitute as a new agent, acting together toward whatever
we decide is our common end. With that said, it's clear that if volition is non-commissive
there is a principle guiding this mediating process. It is a kind of division of labor, akin to
a relay race, in which each agent takes care of practical judgment and action at her time
by taking into account the balance of reasons her past selves and circumstances have left
her with. Yet, just as we can all effectively run a relay race together despite only running
a portion of it individually, the agent whose volitions are non-commissive is capable of
diachronic action as a whole in virtue of the fact that most fundamentally, every agent is
committed to ceding to the next agent in line as time passes. The diachronic action to
which such an agent is ultimately committed is just much more general than the particular
actions she engages in at any given time.
If volitions are peremptorily binding, we are enabled as agents to be efficacious in
the pursuit of particular ends. If volitions are not peremptorily binding, we are enabled as
agents to exercise the legislative authority of our humanity unhindered. Actually, this
evaluation of both cases is mistaken. Neither constitutive feature of agency is undermined
in either case. If volitions are treated as commissive, then they are only commissive as a
result of a constitutive need to endorse them as such, which means that it is constitutive
of an act of reflective endorsement that it produce a volition which will commit our
47

Thus, one could not argue that failing to treat volitions as commissive expresses an irrational distrust for
the deliberative capacities of one’s past self. Those deliberative capacities are only exercised in the act of
self-constitution, which is precisely what the future self finds itself engaged in doing. Outside of the
constitutive norms of agency, however, there are no standards of correctness for the way we self-constitute.
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future selves. If volitions are treated as non-commissive, then I may freely pursue my
particular ends, it is just that I do not have the authority to determine whether or not other
agents, including my future selves, pursue those particular ends. My practical judgments
are not voided, they are merely highly provisional, missing the direct stipulations that a
peremptorily binding volition possesses. In many ways, the agent governed by
commissive volitions and the one governed by non-commissive volitions are in the same
boat, since they both must leave their commitments open to redeliberation in the face of
encounters with other agents they may need to enter into interpersonal cooperation with
or in the face of circumstances that they were not able to anticipate in their practical
deliberations.
As I argued above, if it turns out that both commissive and non-commissive
volition seem like viable options for diachronic self-governance, then it will turn out that
commissive volition is never a viable option for diachronic self-governance since it is
only such an option if it is constitutive (i.e. it is the only option). To reiterate, if
commissive volition is not a necessary norm for agency then it may either be endorsed or
not endorsed by later selves with whom I must cooperate in order to be able to act. It is a
constitutive norm that I cooperate with them. Thus, if I insist on commissive volition and
my later self disagrees, then I will have failed to cooperate and will undermine my own
efficacy in diachronic action. The peculiar situation of separation across time in cases of
diachronic action leads to the result that our volitions cannot take the form of
commitment that Korsgaard describes in the first step of her argument for public reasons.
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Conclusion
I have attempted to show that Korsgaard’s commitment to the publicity of reasons
is incompatible with her account of volition as determinate commitment. I think, at the
least, I have shown that there are serious tensions between the two and that Korsgaard has
not paid enough attention to the issues particular to diachronic agency. Perhaps this is
because she does not think it necessary, since the unification of wills that constitutes our
cooperation with other agents “cannot take place under the conditions of space and
time.”48 Regardless, much elaboration is needed in order to make clear what the precise
demands of public reasons are. This is crucial in the diachronic case, since the diachronic
case is the case she ultimately appeals to in her argument to reasons are public.
Furthermore, all our interactions with other agents in interpersonal cases will necessarily
involve cooperation with future selves occupying the bodies of those involved, and so
understanding how we reason practically in the diachronic case will affect how we reason
in interpersonal cases.
The most fundamental point I have attempted to make is just this: if noncommissive volitions undermine our capacity to act, then we must be constitutively
committed to commissive volitions and vice-versa. This is an important point when
considering the issue, regardless of the success of my arguments that non-commissive
volitions do not undermine our capacity to act, at least not moreso than the many
circumstances we are faced with which fall outside our anticipatory deliberations do so.
At the very least, the stakes should be clear: Korsgaard needs to make further argument
that commitment is constitutive of volition or abandon a model of diachronic agency that
includes commitment.
48
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